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War?

SuN

SuN

.:~**~.~**~.~**~:.
Saudi-Syrian efforts to defuse tension increase

BEIRUT: Saudi-Syrian attempts to break the Lebanese political deadlock over the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) appeared over the weekend to be in a race against time over the STL’s impending indictment into the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Hizbullah, which is widely expected to be implicated in the killing, has made clear warnings that Lebanon faces the threat of instability if the Saudi-Syrian mediation efforts fail to find a solution – acceptable to rival Lebanese factions – for the crisis over the STL’s indictment.

Hizbullah’s warning came amid reports that Prince Abdel-Aziz bin Abdullah, son of Saudi King Abdullah, arrived in Damascus Sunday as part of the ongoing Saudi-Syrian bid aimed at maintaining stability in Lebanon.

Syria and Saudi Arabia, which wield considerable influence on rival Lebanese factions, are coordinating their efforts in a bid to find a solution to the crisis over the indictment acceptable to both the March 8 and 14 camps.

Media reports quoted an unnamed official in Damascus as saying that Saudi Arabia and Syria are convinced of the necessity to prevent an explosion in Lebanon over the indictment. The two countries are discussing a host of proposals in a bid to reach a joint agreement aimed at protecting Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment, the reports said.

A key political adviser to Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said that his party was counting on Saudi-Syrian attempts to defuse political tension over the indictment, and he warned that the failure of these attempts could destabilize Lebanon.

“The Saudi-Syrian effort to save Lebanon from the crisis is in a feverish race with American pressure exerted on the international tribunal in order to hasten [release of] the so-called indictment,” Hussein Khalil told reporters Saturday after meeting with MP Michel Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to thank him for his positions in support of Hizbullah during his visit to France last week.

“We hope that the Arab effort will beat all the other hostile attempts because [failure of Arab effort] could push Lebanon into the unknown, which we do not want,” Khalil said. The word “unknown” is Lebanese jargon that could mean anything from chaos and instability to strife.

Arab and foreign leaders have voiced concern over stability in Lebanon due to the indictment, which is threatening to plunge the country into renewed sectarian strife. Nasrallah, and Arab and foreign media reports, said that the indictment is expected to accuse some Hizbullah members of involvement in the massive suicide truck bombing that killed Hariri and 22 others on February 14, 2005.

In a dramatic development signaling that the STL is setting the stage for an indictment implicating Hizbullah, the tribunal’s judges have changed the court’s rules to clarify when a trial in absentia can be staged if suspects refuse to surrender.

The changes appear to reflect concerns that once prosecutors name suspects they may not be able to arrest them. Under changes to the STL’s rules announced Friday, a trial in absentia could be ordered around 60 days after an indictment is issued. The tribunal already had provisions for trying suspects in their absence, but had not set time limits for when it could happen.

The court’s amendments apparently came in response to Nasrallah’s recent declaration that Hizbullah will not allow the arrest of any of its fighters charged in Hariri’s assassination.

In a televised speech on November 11, Nasrallah, who has denied that his group was involved in Hariri’s killing, vowed to “cut off the hand” that tries to arrest any Hizbullah fighter named in the indictment.

Tensions have been simmering for months between the March 8 and 14 camps over the STL. The STL is expected to hand down its indictment before the end of the year.

The tension heightened fears of sectarian strife in Lebanon, especially if the STL’s indictment implicates Hizbullah. Hizbullah and its allies in the March 8 camp refuse to recognize the STL, dismissing it as an “Israeli-American tool” designed to incite strife.


Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain leader, and his allies in the rival March 14 coalition have upheld support for the STL as the best means to reveal the truth behind his father’s assassination. He has also reassured worried Lebanese that there will be no sectarian strife.

MP Okab Saqr, a member of Hariri’s Parliamentary Future bloc, said that he expected a Saudi-Syrian solution to the Lebanese crisis over the indictment to be ready within two weeks. “The Syrian-Saudi solution is the only available solution. I don’t think anyone will reject it because this amounts to a rejection of Lebanon’s protection,” Saqr said in an interview with Al- Jadeed TV Saturday.

MP Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the

Marada Movement, said that Saudi-Syrian good offices were in race with American attempts seeking to destabilize Lebanon.

“There is a race between the Syrian-Saudi efforts and the US policy. We hope that the Syrian-Saudi good offices will beat all other attempts,” Franjieh told reporters in the northern village of Bna’shi after meeting with Aoun. He said that Lebanese factions that support the US attempts did not want to serve Lebanon’s interest. “The West, particularly America, does not want good for this country. They want a Shiite-Sunni rift so that Israel can be relieved,” Franjieh said. He added that he was worried about the situation, saying he feared that Israel might intervene to destabilize Lebanon.

Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel said March 14 parties might approve a foreign or domestic backed compromise to Lebanon’s political deadlock, but only after justice is served by the STL.

“Today we do not need a new national pact or Taif Accord or a second Doha agreement but we rather need a verdict against those who killed our martyrs and afterwards we can talk and welcome all local, Arab and international mediations,” Gemayel said.

He was speaking after a mass held in Jdeideh Sunday to mark the fourth anniversary of his son, former Metn MP, Pierre who was assassinated in a nearby region in daylight by masked men who intercepted his car and shot him.

MP Mohammed Raad, head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, said that the STL’s indictment is seeking to target the Resistance’s head. He said that after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and internal clashes between pro- and anti-government groups in 2008 have failed to destroy Hizbullah, “the Resistance’s head is now being targeted through a fabrication of an indictment that harms the resistance’s role, Mujahedeen and leaders.”

“This accusation is fabricated by big powers which have appointed themselves as protectors of Israel’s security,” Raad told a rally in south Lebanon Sunday. However, he added, that the indictment will not succeed in vilifying “the resistance which is so deep-rooted among our people that it will not be harmed by a rumor, a fake accusation or a fabricated indictment.”

Meanwhile, Aoun said that his five ministers in Hariri’s 30-member national unity Cabinet will not attend any Cabinet session before the issue of “false witnesses” linked to the UN probe in Hariri’s killing is settled. He spoke to reporters after meeting with Franjieh in the northern village of Bna’ shi.

President Michel Sleiman has repeatedly deferred a Cabinet discussion of the issue of “false witnesses” to avoid a further split among the ministers.

Hizbullah and its allies have insisted that the key to reducing political tensions and reaching the truth behind Hariri’s murder lies in prosecuting witnesses who allegedly misled the UN probe with their false testimonies.
 
Hizballah's "zero hour" exercise for toppling Beirut government and war on Israel

Hizballah last Thursday, Oct. 28, conducted a command exercise in all parts of Lebanon to test its armed militia's readiness for what its leaders called "zero hour" i.e. asserting its grip on Lebanon and "cornering" Prime Minister Saad Hariri. debkafile's military sources report the exercise took all day and led up to the sabre-rattling speech delivered by Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah that night, which was interpreted by all Lebanese factions as a declaration of war on their government and the prologue to heating up the border with Israel.

1. Hizballah found it necessary to answer the Israel Defense Forces' recent "electronic exercise," in keeping with a top-level Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah decision never to leave any American or Israel military step without response.
2. It was a practice for the military action planned for the hours leading up to the Special Lebanese Tribunal's issuance of indictments against Hizballah leaders for complicity in the assassination of Lebanese ex-prime minister Rafiq Hariri five years ago.
The "zero hour" exercise demonstrated, according to Hizballah sources, "the quick implementation on the ground" of the necessary deployment. They claimed that in "less than two hours" they were able to "maintain a security and military grip of large areas of Lebanon."

Our sources note that this is the first time Hizballah has leveled publicly about its plan for seizing control of Lebanon by force of arms - even without waiting for the STL indictments to be issued. The disclosure was made five days after the critical command exercise in order to establish a fact. It took advantage of a moment when its key opponents were otherwise engaged.

President Barack Obama has his hands full with the Democrats' sliding rating in polls ahead of the Nov. 2 midterm elections to Congress.
Saudi King Abdullah had an eye on an ambitious initiative to convene a national conciliation conference of all Iraqi factions for breaking the long impasse over the formation of a new government in Baghdad. The Saudi king was seeking an Arab breakthrough that would push Iran off the board.
And in Jerusalem, political circles in Jerusalem are full engaged in the trivia of domestic scandal, such as the illegal employment of a foreign worker at Defense Minster Ehud Barak's home or endless bickering over the stipends for yeshiva students with families.
Hizballah also feels it can safely send its gunmen out on the streets of Beirut and vent its ire on Israel without being jumped on by Western media because they are all totally absorbed in al Qaeda's bomb package plot and its intercontinental ramifications.
 
"Regardless, the main cause for all our miseries is the absence of a State, the absence of strong leadership, the lack of a true command, the lack of BALLS (excuse the term) into many officials’ pants.

Unfortunately, this turned out to be a fact from what we saw lately (ie: the Airport violation incident, the parallel festival organized during the visit of Ahmadinejad, the Syrian arrest warrants, and lately the incident at the Dr. Clinic.., among others).

And again unfortunately, the way I see it, this would certainly lead to another Huge War in Lebanon, because a country with no state is always subject to all disasters, to all own interests seekers.

I personally witnessed that in 1975, and I’m afraid we’re living something similar, and it looks like we’ve learned nothing from our previous experiences, maybe we are a people so much divided to pay attention for all the risks involved.

But am I afraid of that war? Honestly, I’m not, since I think somehow we were and maybe will be better at war than we are now in peace, and that’s because MA FI DAWLI now, while in war each of us can have a state of his own, a real State to say the least."
 
lulzy

To counter the Zionist capitalist imperialist threat, Hezbollah entrepreneurs and a mad Persian scientist collaborated to create their own revolutionary ( and they weren’t kidding about revolutionary) products to counter the spread of Amrika el Shaytan and el 3adou el Sahyouni.

In the early eighties, a newly founded Hezbollah corporation began research on their first product to counter APPLE’s rapid development.

Rumor has it that they wanted to call it the iKidnap or the iBomb or the iNuts but finally they came up with the name based on all of those attributes and coincidentally having the same name as the products founder
They called it The iMad after the creator, mister Mughniyah

THE iMAD is a special device that helps Shiite Jihadists to locate and bomb or kidnap Jewish and American targets.
You can download your favorite screen savers like the picture of it’s founders face on the moon. Retail price 100$ counterfeit dollars made in the bekaa valley. (Batteries and jews not included)

THE iHIDE is a software that can be used on the iMad after killing or bombing and it helps the owner to hide in sewers and holes in the ground. Reportedly developed after the divine ghameeda victory of 2006-2010 the iHide is even used by the sayyed himself. Find maps of every human shield and school yard needed after using the iMad. (school children not included)

THE iRAN this Iranian Revolutionary antisocial network is set to change the face of the regions culture. Can be synced directly with the iMad and iHide to take control of the area you are in. The iRan provides a way to create funds through advertising and spreading antisocial networking. Create your profile on iRan and collect $$$$$$.

THE iMAM is the latest release of this very popular operating system running on dual core Fakih processors that provides answers to all queries. Ask the iMam anything and it answers faster than google. The iMam is so smart that it almost seems like its speaking with the voice of the supreme ruler, …..no no not God, Khomeini you fools. The iMam comes with antizionist viral protection called the SlipperCare which can be downloaded separately.
 
Wissam Eid's Big Discovery: Everything Connected to Landlines inside Hizbullah's Grea

When he was doing his military service in the 1990s, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) noticed Eid's degree in computer engineering.
The security service was then trying to build an information technology department. And that was that.
By the time Hariri was killed in 2005, Eid was a captain in the ISF. His boss, Lt. Col. Samer Shehadeh, brought him into the investigation.
It was a Lebanese investigation, Eid was told, but it was also a U.N. one. Eid was to co-operate with the foreigners working out of the old abandoned hotel in the hills above Beirut, CBC went on to say.
It said Eid reasoned that finding the first traces of the killers was a process of elimination.
From Lebanon's phone companies, he obtained the call records of all the cellphones that had registered with the cell towers in the immediate vicinity of the Hotel St. George, where the massive blast had torn a deep crater.
Once Eid had those records, he began thinning out the hundreds of phones in the area that morning, subtracting those held by each of the 22 dead, then those in Hariri's entourage, then those of people nearby who had been interviewed and had alibis.
Soon enough, he had found the phones the Hariri hit team had used, the CBC report added. The U.N. would eventually dub it the "red" network.
But he didn't stop there, it said. Exhaustively tracking which towers the red phones had "shaken hands with" in the days before the assassination, and comparing those records to Hariri's schedule, Eid discovered that this network had been shadowing the former Premier.
The red-phone carriers were clearly a disciplined group. They communicated with one another and almost never with an outside phone. And directly after the assassination, the red network went dead forever.
But Eid, according to the report, had found another connection. He eventually identified eight other phones that had for months simultaneously used the same cell towers as the red phones.
Signals intelligence professionals call these "co-location" phones.
What Capt. Eid had discovered was that everyone on the hit team had carried a second phone, and that the team members had used their second phones to communicate with a much larger support network that had been in existence for at least a year.
Eventually, the U.N. would label that group the "blue" network.
CBC said the blue network also exercised considerable discipline. It, too, remained a "closed" network. Not once did any blue-network member make the sort of slip that telecom sleuths look for.
But these people also carried co-location phones and Eid kept following the ever-widening trail of crumbs, it said.
The big break came when the blue network was closed down and the phones were collected by a minor electronics specialist who worked for Hizbullah, Abd al Majid al Ghamloush, the report said.
It said Ghamloush was, in the words of one former UN investigator, "an idiot."
Given the job of collecting and disposing of the blue phones, he noticed some still had time remaining on them and used one to call his girlfriend, Sawan, in the process basically identifying himself to Capt. Eid. He might as well have written his name on a whiteboard and held it up outside ISF headquarters.
Ghamloush's "******ity" eventually led Eid to a pair of brothers named Hussein and Mouin Khreis, both Hizbullah operatives. One of them had actually been at the site of the blast.
Capt. Eid kept going, identifying more and more phones directly or indirectly associated with the hit team. He found the core of a third network, a longer-term surveillance team that would eventually be dubbed the "yellows."
Eid's work would also lead to another discovery: Everything connected, however elliptically, to land lines inside Hizbullah's Great Prophet Hospital in South Beirut, a sector of the city entirely controlled by Hizbullah, CBC added.
It has long been said that the fundamentalist fighters operate a command centre in the hospital.
Eventually, telecom sleuths would identify another network of four so-called "pink phones" that had been communicating both with the hospital and, indirectly, with the other networks.
These phones turned out to be tremendously important. It turned out they had been issued by the Lebanese government itself and when the ministry of communications was queried about who they had been issued to, the answer came back in the form of a bland government record.
CBC has obtained a copy of this record provided to the commission. On it, someone has highlighted four entries in a long column of six-digit numbers. Beside the highlighted numbers, in Arabic, was the word "Hizbullah."
Finally, Eid was handed a clue from the best source possible: He was contacted by Hizbullah itself and told that some of the phones he was chasing were being used by Hizbullah agents conducting a counter-espionage operation against Israel's Mossad spy agency and that he needed to back off.
The warning could not have been more clear, CBC said.
As though to underscore it, Eid's boss, Lt. Col. Shehadeh, was targeted by bombers in September 2006. The blast killed four of his bodyguards and nearly killed Shehadeh, who was sent to Quebec for medical treatment and resettlement.
By that time, Capt. Eid had sent his report to the U.N. inquiry and moved on to another operation.
The Eid report, according to CBC was entered into the U.N.'s database by someone who either didn't understand it or didn't care enough to bring it forward. It disappeared.
A year and a half later, in December 2007, when the Eid report finally resurfaced, the immediate reaction of the U.N. telecom team was embarrassment. And then suspicion.
Eid claimed to have performed his analysis using nothing but Excel spreadsheets and that, said the British specialist, was impossible.
No one, he declared, could accomplish such a thing without powerful computer assistance and the requisite training. No amateur, which is how the specialists regarded Eid, could possibly have waded through the millions of possible permutations posed by the phone records and extracted individual networks.
The most recent outbreak of large-scale sectarian violence was in January and February 2008 when armed militias fought in the streets of Tripoli and other large centers, the report said.
This Capt. Eid must have had help, it said, thought the telecom experts. Someone must have given him this information. Perhaps he was involved somehow?
By now it was January 2008. A new U.N. commissioner was in charge, Daniel Bellemare. Investigators were finally beginning to believe they were getting somewhere.
A deputation of telecom experts was dispatched to meet Eid. They questioned him and returned convinced that, somehow, he had indeed identified the networks himself.
Eid appeared to be one of those people who could intuit mathematical patterns, the sort who thinks several moves ahead in chess. Even better, he was willing to help directly. He wanted Hariri's killers to face justice, Hizbullah's warning be damned.
It was an exciting prospect for the U.N. team. Here was an actual Lebanese investigator, with insights and contacts the UN foreigners could never match.
A week later, a larger U.N. team met with Capt. Eid and, again, all went well.
Then, the next day, Jan. 25, 2008, eight days after his first meeting with the UN investigators, Capt. Wissam Eid met precisely the same fate as Hariri. The bomb that ripped apart his four-wheel-drive vehicle also killed his bodyguard and three innocent bystanders.
Because there was no doubt in the mind of any member of the telecom team why Eid had died: Hizbullah, they deduced, had found out that Capt. Eid's report had been discovered, that he'd met with the U.N. investigators and that he had agreed to work with them.
Immediately, the telecom team had the records of the cell towers near the Eid blast site collected, reasoning the killers might once again have left digital footprints they could follow.
Not this time, though. There was nothing. This time the killers did what they should have been doing all along: They'd used radios, not cellphones. Radios don't leave a trace.
That left the U.N. team with the obvious problem. Their adversary obviously knew not only what the U.N. investigators were doing, but knew in considerable detail.
And the more the U.N. investigators thought about it, CBC said, the more they focused on one man: Col. Wissam al-Hassan, the new head of Lebanese police intelligence.


Beirut, 23 Nov 10, 07:53
Naharnet.
 
Wissam Eid's Big Discovery: Everything Connected to Landlines inside Hizbullah's Grea

When he was doing his military service in the 1990s, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) noticed Eid's degree in computer engineering.
The security service was then trying to build an information technology department. And that was that.
By the time Hariri was killed in 2005, Eid was a captain in the ISF. His boss, Lt. Col. Samer Shehadeh, brought him into the investigation.
It was a Lebanese investigation, Eid was told, but it was also a U.N. one. Eid was to co-operate with the foreigners working out of the old abandoned hotel in the hills above Beirut, CBC went on to say.
It said Eid reasoned that finding the first traces of the killers was a process of elimination.
From Lebanon's phone companies, he obtained the call records of all the cellphones that had registered with the cell towers in the immediate vicinity of the Hotel St. George, where the massive blast had torn a deep crater.
Once Eid had those records, he began thinning out the hundreds of phones in the area that morning, subtracting those held by each of the 22 dead, then those in Hariri's entourage, then those of people nearby who had been interviewed and had alibis.
Soon enough, he had found the phones the Hariri hit team had used, the CBC report added. The U.N. would eventually dub it the "red" network.
But he didn't stop there, it said. Exhaustively tracking which towers the red phones had "shaken hands with" in the days before the assassination, and comparing those records to Hariri's schedule, Eid discovered that this network had been shadowing the former Premier.
The red-phone carriers were clearly a disciplined group. They communicated with one another and almost never with an outside phone. And directly after the assassination, the red network went dead forever.
But Eid, according to the report, had found another connection. He eventually identified eight other phones that had for months simultaneously used the same cell towers as the red phones.
Signals intelligence professionals call these "co-location" phones.
What Capt. Eid had discovered was that everyone on the hit team had carried a second phone, and that the team members had used their second phones to communicate with a much larger support network that had been in existence for at least a year.
Eventually, the U.N. would label that group the "blue" network.
CBC said the blue network also exercised considerable discipline. It, too, remained a "closed" network. Not once did any blue-network member make the sort of slip that telecom sleuths look for.
But these people also carried co-location phones and Eid kept following the ever-widening trail of crumbs, it said.
The big break came when the blue network was closed down and the phones were collected by a minor electronics specialist who worked for Hizbullah, Abd al Majid al Ghamloush, the report said.
It said Ghamloush was, in the words of one former UN investigator, "an idiot."
Given the job of collecting and disposing of the blue phones, he noticed some still had time remaining on them and used one to call his girlfriend, Sawan, in the process basically identifying himself to Capt. Eid. He might as well have written his name on a whiteboard and held it up outside ISF headquarters.
Ghamloush's "******ity" eventually led Eid to a pair of brothers named Hussein and Mouin Khreis, both Hizbullah operatives. One of them had actually been at the site of the blast.
Capt. Eid kept going, identifying more and more phones directly or indirectly associated with the hit team. He found the core of a third network, a longer-term surveillance team that would eventually be dubbed the "yellows."
Eid's work would also lead to another discovery: Everything connected, however elliptically, to land lines inside Hizbullah's Great Prophet Hospital in South Beirut, a sector of the city entirely controlled by Hizbullah, CBC added.
It has long been said that the fundamentalist fighters operate a command centre in the hospital.
Eventually, telecom sleuths would identify another network of four so-called "pink phones" that had been communicating both with the hospital and, indirectly, with the other networks.
These phones turned out to be tremendously important. It turned out they had been issued by the Lebanese government itself and when the ministry of communications was queried about who they had been issued to, the answer came back in the form of a bland government record.
CBC has obtained a copy of this record provided to the commission. On it, someone has highlighted four entries in a long column of six-digit numbers. Beside the highlighted numbers, in Arabic, was the word "Hizbullah."
Finally, Eid was handed a clue from the best source possible: He was contacted by Hizbullah itself and told that some of the phones he was chasing were being used by Hizbullah agents conducting a counter-espionage operation against Israel's Mossad spy agency and that he needed to back off.
The warning could not have been more clear, CBC said.
As though to underscore it, Eid's boss, Lt. Col. Shehadeh, was targeted by bombers in September 2006. The blast killed four of his bodyguards and nearly killed Shehadeh, who was sent to Quebec for medical treatment and resettlement.
By that time, Capt. Eid had sent his report to the U.N. inquiry and moved on to another operation.
The Eid report, according to CBC was entered into the U.N.'s database by someone who either didn't understand it or didn't care enough to bring it forward. It disappeared.
A year and a half later, in December 2007, when the Eid report finally resurfaced, the immediate reaction of the U.N. telecom team was embarrassment. And then suspicion.
Eid claimed to have performed his analysis using nothing but Excel spreadsheets and that, said the British specialist, was impossible.
No one, he declared, could accomplish such a thing without powerful computer assistance and the requisite training. No amateur, which is how the specialists regarded Eid, could possibly have waded through the millions of possible permutations posed by the phone records and extracted individual networks.
The most recent outbreak of large-scale sectarian violence was in January and February 2008 when armed militias fought in the streets of Tripoli and other large centers, the report said.
This Capt. Eid must have had help, it said, thought the telecom experts. Someone must have given him this information. Perhaps he was involved somehow?
By now it was January 2008. A new U.N. commissioner was in charge, Daniel Bellemare. Investigators were finally beginning to believe they were getting somewhere.
A deputation of telecom experts was dispatched to meet Eid. They questioned him and returned convinced that, somehow, he had indeed identified the networks himself.
Eid appeared to be one of those people who could intuit mathematical patterns, the sort who thinks several moves ahead in chess. Even better, he was willing to help directly. He wanted Hariri's killers to face justice, Hizbullah's warning be damned.
It was an exciting prospect for the U.N. team. Here was an actual Lebanese investigator, with insights and contacts the UN foreigners could never match.
A week later, a larger U.N. team met with Capt. Eid and, again, all went well.
Then, the next day, Jan. 25, 2008, eight days after his first meeting with the UN investigators, Capt. Wissam Eid met precisely the same fate as Hariri. The bomb that ripped apart his four-wheel-drive vehicle also killed his bodyguard and three innocent bystanders.
Because there was no doubt in the mind of any member of the telecom team why Eid had died: Hizbullah, they deduced, had found out that Capt. Eid's report had been discovered, that he'd met with the U.N. investigators and that he had agreed to work with them.
Immediately, the telecom team had the records of the cell towers near the Eid blast site collected, reasoning the killers might once again have left digital footprints they could follow.
Not this time, though. There was nothing. This time the killers did what they should have been doing all along: They'd used radios, not cellphones. Radios don't leave a trace.
That left the U.N. team with the obvious problem. Their adversary obviously knew not only what the U.N. investigators were doing, but knew in considerable detail.
And the more the U.N. investigators thought about it, CBC said, the more they focused on one man: Col. Wissam al-Hassan, the new head of Lebanese police intelligence.


Beirut, 23 Nov 10, 07:53
Naharnet.
 
Here's the good news: Saudi Arabia is one of our BIGGEST arms customers! Maybe they'll go to war and spend a lot of money on F-15's and other goodies. Good for our Economy.

Face it folks, war is GREAT for the US economy, as long as we aren't doing the fighting.

Same reason we need OUT of S. Korea now...before it hits the fan. We'll sell the south Koreans all of the bullets they need!
 
^ totally getting prickly thar...

[YOUTUBE]IMRD3z_mTqI[/YOUTUBE]
lol @ the christian philange
 
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